posted April 13, 2005 02:29 AM         

The Press generally went by TamilNet reports of a swift, sharp and clean 'three-pronged attack'. The sea movement was not referred to by LTTE sources until the TamilNet editor published his column in the Daily Mirror of 16th April. Early TamilNet reports only referred to the crossing of Verugal River. TamilNet spoke of Karuna's forces rejoining Prabhakaran in large numbers. The propaganda momentum was kept up with the handing over to UNICEF on the 13th of those who had 'rejoined'.

The first dissonant note came when on 14th April TamilNet published just 4 names of persons, all conveniently from Batticaloa, as the only casualties from LTTE(P). These contradicted Iqbal Athas' figures based on radio interceptions by the Army which placed LTTE(P) casualties at 40 dead and100 wounded, suggesting that fighting had been heavy. Athas' figures tallied with reports from civilians in the area that three tractor-trailers were seen taking the dead and injured northwards. D.B.S. Jeyaraj has been among the journalists who have tried to pursue the truth methodically.

The LTTE(P) crossed the Verugal and started the attack about 1.30 AM on Good Friday, 9th April. About the same time there was a sea borne attack on Kathiravelly camp south of Verugal. The main fighting and deaths were at Verugal, while those at Kathiravelly appear to have surrendered soon or escaped. The attack was least expected because Good Friday, Easter and the traditional New Year season came in quick succession. In the earlier years of war these have been times of a formal or an informal ceasefire. A large number among Karuna's forces at Verugal were children who had not seen battle.

Soon after the fighting started, Karuna sent in some seasoned fighters, which accounts for the 40 or more deaths reported among the attackers, with several more injured. But within half an hour of the fighting Karuna ordered everyone to pull back and the children to run home. A large number of children ran in confusion without knowing where they were going. A number of civilians, perhaps half a dozen, were killed in the shelling and crossfire. A boy standing near a shop was killed by a shell.

Relatives of local folk were affected and public anger mounted when they heard that significant numbers of Karuna's troops had been massacred after they had surrendered or while they were laying down their arms. Families wanted to collect the bodies in the morning, but the incoming Vanni (LTTE(P)) forces prevented them. This was when they protested and according to some reports blocked the road.

Some accounts speak of planned attacks on surrendering cadres. Other killings of those who were surrendering may not have been premeditated. One youth from near Sittandy, who was in Karuna's army, said that he was in a group of ten who were surrendering when one in the group opened fire. The Vanni forces fired on all of them killing at least four. The youth himself surrendered and was later released.

A subsequent counter attack by Karuna forces failed. A particular incident that was widely talked about shows the nasty mood of the Vanni forces. These forces reportedly fired an RPG at an ambulance that was carrying away an injured woman officer, Kayatri, from Karuna's forces. The patient and driver were both killed. The driver lay bleeding for several hours and the people were prevented from going to his aid. By the time help was allowed, it was too late.

On the evening of the following day, 11th April, besieged by mothers demanding their children, Karuna disbanded his forces. Overcome by shock a number of his troops were reluctant to go home, as were 300 girls in a camp of 600, who were still around on the 12th morning. Karuna exploded a grenade to show that he meant business. He had the means to carry on the fight. Karuna left with some of his followers a little later after releasing several of his prisoners, but killing Neelan, a subordinate of Pottu Amman's whom Karuna believed had been sent to deal with him.