posted July 24, 2002 10:13 AM            

The Liberation Tigers last week marked the tenth anniversary of the official establishment of the their naval wing, the Sea Tigers. Suthaharan Nadarajah looks at the development and success of this unique fighting force.

GIVEN the dynamics of conflict in an Indian ocean island, the Sea Tigers are now a vital part of the combat capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Having expanded considerably from its humble beginnings in the early days of the Tamil armed struggle, the naval service today fields several thousand cadres including specialists from marine engineers to naval commandos.

Having outgrown the fishing dinghies in which they began, the Sea Tigers now deploy squadrons of heavily armed gunboats and speedboats. "Uniquely [amongst guerrilla groups] the LTTE has taken on the Sri Lanka Navy with unprecedented success," Jane's International Defence Review said in a report on Sri Lanka published as early as 1996.

But the LTTE naval capabilities extend beyond its more visible green water fleet. Military analysts say the Sea Tigers also manage a fleet of ocean going supply vessels that keep the LTTE's substantial military machine supplied with everything from hitech weapons to toothpaste.

The Sea Tigers have their origins in the boatmen who, in the early days of the armed struggle, sped in motorised fishing boats between northern Sri Lanka and southern India, moving weapons, ammunition and other supplies into the island and shuttling new LTTE volunteers to training camps on the mainland.

Hailing from the fishing communities, on the northern coast, they were excellent seamen, intimately familiar with the waters around the island and, according to common rumour, well versed in smuggling, having run cigarettes and commercial goods on the same routes.

Though reportedly not organised into any formal structure, they formed the backbone of the Liberation Tigers' supply lines. But lightly armed, their small craft were no match for the Sri Lanka Navy's gunboats. Speed when evasion failed was their protection. A few attacks were later mounted on SLN vessels using floating mines, but with limited success.

However, as the LTTE expanded and the Indian mainland became untenable as the basis for a sustained campaign in the island, the Tigers began developing their naval capabilities, acquiring larger boats capable of greater speed, with bigger payloads and equipped with heavier weapons an evolutionary path which continues to be followed today.

The watershed came in 1991 when the LTTE launched its siege of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) base complex at Elephant Pass. Despite surrounding and isolating the garrison, after several weeks of heavy fighting, the LTTE was forced to call off its operation: the SLN broke the siege by landing several thousand SLA reinforcements on the coast near the base and then marching inland.

This defeat, and the increasing need to provide supply lines from other locations apart from southern India, led Tiger commanders to conclude that establishing a robust naval force was a priority if the Sri Lankan armed forces were to be successfully challenged.

As LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan stated at the time: "Geographically, the security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas. Its only when we are strong in the seas and break the dominance our enemy now has that we will be able to retain land areas we liberated and drive our enemies from our homeland."

The Sea Tigers were thus established as a selfcontained wing and considerable effort and funds were invested in its development. In 1991, (now Colonel) Soosai was appointed Special Commander and Gangai Amaran Commander (the latter was much later killed in an ambush on land by Sri Lankan commandos). Many observers credit the Sea Tigers' growth and expansion, as well as its esprit de corps, to Soosai's frontline command and leadership.

The results of the LTTE's naval project were unexpectedly successful, with 1993 proving a turning point for the Sea Tigers. By August that year SLN patrols in the Kilali lagoon had come to an end after several battles in the shallow waters. The Navy's withdrawal left nearby SLA base complexes at Elephant Pass and Pooneryn exposed on their coastal flanks and proved catastrophic subsequently.

In the same month, for the first time, the Sea Tigers sank an SLN 'Super Dvora' off Point Pedro, killing 13 personnel including 5 officers and shattering the perceived invulnerability of these large, heavily armed Israeli built vessels.

In November the LTTE launched a massive assault on the SLA garrison at Pooneryn. Sea Tiger units led the coastal attacks, sinking SLN boats protecting the base and clearing the way for LTTE ground units. The Sea Tigers also fought off repeated Sri Lankan efforts to relieve the base by landing reinforcements in the KalmunaiPallikuda area. The LTTE left the area in midNovember having stripped the base of its equipment and razed it to the ground.

The development of the LTTE navy was continued aggressively. The Sea Tigers now deploy several large craft, from heavily armed gunboats to supply boats and troop carriers capable of accommodating platoon sized units. Many of the vessels are designed and built at extensive, camouflaged boatyards located along the Vanni coastline.

Defence analysts say the LTTE's ocean going supply vessels are now capable of delivering weaponry ranging from surface to air missiles to artillery pieces along with medical supplies, fuel and everything the LTTE's growing conventional army needs.

The upgraded combat capabilities of the Sea Tigers were clearly demonstrated during the LTTE's assault on the SLA base complex at Mullaitivu in 1996. Apart from quietly ferrying several hundred troops to their attack positions, Sea Tiger vessels placed a screen around the coastal garrison, thwarting repeated determined efforts by the Sri Lankan navy to relieve the surrounded base. This time, the LTTE stayed in the captured base establishing contiguous coastal control from the Jaffna peninusula to just north of Trincomalee.

By 2000, the Sea Tigers were routinely taking the fight to the SLN. On June 5, two Super Dvoras and another pair severely damaged in a major clash off the Jaffna peninsula. Sri Lanka Air Force Mi24 gunships and Kfr fighter bombers failed to hold off the LTTE boats. Barely three weeks later, an SLN supply vessel, the MV Merces Uhana, was intercepted with its Dvora escorts over 50 miles from Point Pedro harbour and damaged beyond repair. Several escorting Dvoras were also badly damaged.

As with any navy, the Sea Tigers have their own marine forces: several hundred commandos who can be inserted behind Sri Lanka lines for guerrilla raids and intelligence gathering or spearhead an assault on a major coastal target. Sea Tiger divers, another elite unit, have infiltrate Sri Lankan naval harbours to lay mines and conduct reconnaissance and recovered material from sunken SLN craft. Barriers in the form of underwater nets and sonar buoys have now been added to the harbour defences.

A demonstration of the commandos abilities came on October 23, 2000 when they penetrated the SLN's largest naval facility at Trincomalee where up to 80% of the fleet is based and sank a naval gunboat and a troop transport, shooting down an Mi24 gunship in the process. Two other troop carriers were badly damaged. Fighting raged inside the high security zone for three hours before the commandos finally withdrew.

Technology plays an integral part of Sea Tiger operations. Coastal radar stations support those carried by some of the gunboats. Night vision equipment allows the exploitation of darkness for bringing in supplies and launching raids. Global Position System (GPS) equipment reportedly helps the supply ships rendezvous several dozen miles off the coastline with the fast boats that shuttle the material to the shore.

Sophisticated communication systems permits the coordination of multi vessel 'wolf pack' type attacks on Sri Lankan convoys. Sea Tigers boat designs are continuously refined and improved upon. Jane's Defence Review claimed in March 2001 that the Sea Tigers were prototyping stealth boats capable of evading radar. "The Tamil population are by tradition expert boat builders," Jane's analyst wrote.

But at the core of the Sea Tigers success is the volunteer, the service insists. The men and women must be indefatigable, able to endure the rigours of the Indian Ocean, from extreme night cold to searing heat of day, often for long periods in tumultuous seas which can easily swamp the small vessels and scatter their occupants. The most important quality, according to veterans, is courage.

One of the most important and least publicised roles performed by the Sea Tigers is extracting LTTE soldiers from Sri Lanka Armyheld territory, often under fire. LTTE commandos or even ordinary troops being pursued by Sri Lankan forces and seeking evacuation are reassured when informed a Sea Tiger unit has been tasked for their rescue: "They always come. Whatever the weather, they always come," one now retired veteran who hitched his fair share of rides home told Tamil Guardian.

Another requisite trait, is confidence. Almost always outgunned, Sea Tigers go out repeatedly to engage the Sri Lanka Navy which is often supported by aircraft to disrupt SLN supply convoys or protect LTTE ones and destroy SLN craft at sea and in harbour. The SLN's efforts to protect supply convoys to the SLA's massive Jaffna garrison by routing them forty to fifty miles off LTTEheld stretches of coastline have not been successful, as the Sea Tigers have struck even at that distance.

Sri Lankan commanders say a favourite tactic is for a cluster of Sea Tiger boats to stay close together so that they appear as one blip on radar, dispersing just before launching an attack. Given the massive firepower the Sea Tigers now cram onto their decks, survival is often a dash for harbour: top speeds in combat are now in excess of 50 knots.

The formation of the Black Sea Tiger section, also in 1990, was driven by efforts to challenge the SLN's technical superiority. Large, heavily armed Sri Lankan vessels like the Israelibuilt Dvoras or Super Dvoras which are crewed by a dozen sailors, can absorb heavy punishment and their destruction can be assured only by a massive blast. Black Sea Tigers use small boats packed with explosives to race in under covering fire from other craft and trigger an explosion alongside the targets, which along with the attackers rarely survive. Slow moving Sri Lankan supply vessels and troop transports are also priority targets.

The first Black Sea Tiger attack was conducted off Valvettithurai in the Jaffna peninsula on 10 July 1990 when Maj Kantharuban, Capt Collins and Capt Vinoth badly damaged the SLN ship 'Edithara. ' In another attack on May 4, 1991, Capt Sithamparam and Capt Jeyanthan sank the SLN command ship 'Abitha. '

During the battle for Elephant Pass in 2000, the Sea Tigers demonstrated another phase of their development. The LTTE naval wing conducted a massive amphibious operation, landing over fifteen hundred Tiger troops undetected on the Jaffna coastline along with their weapons. SLA defences, including and a Special Forces base, in the area collapsed under the subsequent ground attack, a crucial event in a chain which led to the collapse of the Elephant Pass base complex.

That dominance at sea is key to the outcome of the armed conflict is manifest in the efforts both navies are putting into their respective development. Last year's reports of experimentation with stealth technology and the increasingly sophisticated boats now being deployed underline the Sea Tigers' race with the Sri Lanka Navy for technological superiority.

Conscious of its opponent's growing capabilities, the SLN is looking at its options also. Earlier this year the SLN sent a toplevel delegation to study Chinese naval craft. Israel, which has in recent years been the SLN's primary supplier of naval craft provided two craft capable of launching shiptoship missiles, while the Indian military supplied an intelligence gathering vessel bristling with radar and electronic surveillance equipment presently the largest ship in the SLN's inventory. SLN plans to build an air wing of its own have not been taken forward, with the Sri Lanka Air Force expected to provide air support at sea.

The SLN has sought an edge over the LTTE by equipping their vessels with sophisticated sensors and fire control systems. Armour plating is another option as is massive firepower automatic grenade launchers and much heavier automatic cannon. Using captured and procured weapons, the Sea Tigers are also keeping pace. Whilst efforts to resolve Sri Lanka's protracted ethnic conflict continue with Norwegian facilitation, the military formations on both sides are prudently continuing to maintain and expand their capabilities. As the Sea Tigers mark ten years of established service, its ranks will inevitably be striving to improve their already substantial capabilities.