posted December 18, 2001 03:11 PM
INDO - SRI LANKA AGREEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka.
The President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayawardene, and the Prime
Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. Rajiv
Gandhi, having met at Colombo on 29 July 1987:
Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying
and strengthening the traditional friendship of Sri Lankà
and India, and acknowledging the imperative need of
resolving the ethnic problem Sri Lanka, and the consequent
violence, and for the safety, well - being and prosperity of
people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka.
Have this day entered into the following agreement to
fulfil this objective in this context.
1.1. desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka:
1.2. acknowledging that Sri Lanka is multi - ethnic
and multi - lingual plural society consisting, inter alia,
of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors) and Burghers:
1.3. recognising that the Northern and the Eastern
Provinces have been areas of historical habitation of Sri
Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all times
hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic
groups:
1.5. conscious of the necessity of strengthening the
forces contributing to the unity, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its
character as a multi - ethnic, multi - lingual and
multireligious plural society, in which all citizens can
live in equality, safety and harmony, and prosper and
fulfil their aspirations:
2. Resolve that:
2.1. Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes
to permit adjoining Provinces to join to form one
administrative unit and also by a referendum to
separate as may be permitted to the Northern and
Eastern Provinces as outlined below:
2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an
interim period (i.e. from the date of the elections to the
Provincial Council, as specified in para 2.8 to the date of
the Referendum as specified in para 2.3 the Northern and
Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one
administrative unit, having one elected Provincial
Council. Such a unit will have one Governor, on Chief
Minister and one Board of Ministers.
2.3. There will be a referendum on or before 31
December 1988 to enable the people of the Eastern
Provinces to decide whether:
(a) The Eastern Province should remain
linked with the Northern Province as one
administrative unit, and continue to be governed
together with the Northern Province as specified in
para 2.2, or
(b) The Eastern Province should constitute
a separate administrative unit having it's own
distinct Provincial Council with separate Governor,
Chief Minister and Board of Ministers.
The President may, at his discretion decide
to postpone such a referendum.
2.4. All persons who have been displaced due to
ethnic violence, or other reasons, will have the right to
vote in such a referendum. Necessary conditions to
enable them to return to areas form where they were
displaced will be created.
2.5. The referendum when held, will be monitored
by a commitee headed by the Chief Justice, a member
appointed by the President, nominated by the
Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by
the President, nominated by the representatives of the
Tamil speaking people of the Eastern Province.
2.6. A simple majority will be sufficient to
determine the result of the referendum.
2.7. Meetings and other forms of propaganda,
permissible within the laws of the country, will be
allowed before the referendum.
2.8. Elections to Provincial Councils will be held
within the next three months, in any event before 31
December 1987. Indian observers will be invited for
elections to the Provincial Council of the North and
East.
2.9. The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and
Northern Provinces by 15 August 1987. The process
of surrendering of arms and the confining of security
personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed
wlthin 72 hours or the cessation of hostilities coming
into effect.
2.10. The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise for
the purpose of law enforcement and maintenance of
security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces the
same organisations and mechanisms of government
as are used in the rest of the country.
2.11. The President of Sri Lanka will grant a
general amnesty to political and other prisoners now
held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act
and other Emergency laws, and to combatants, as well
as to those persons accused, charged and / or
convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri
Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant
youth with a view to bringing them back into the
mainstream of natiónal life. India willl co - operate in
the process.
2.12 The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and
abide by the above provisions and expect all others to
do likewise.
2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is
accepted, the Government of Sri Lanka will implement
the relevent proposals forthwith.
2.14 The Government of India will undervurite and
guarantee the resolutions, and co - operate in the
implementation of these proposals.
2.15 These proposals are conditional to an
acceptance of the proposals negotiated from 4 May
1986 to 19 December 1986. Residual matters not
finalised during the above negotiations shall be
resolved between India and Sri Lanka within a period
of six weeks of signing this agreement. These
proposals are also conditional to the Government of
India co-operating directly with the Government of Sri
Lanka in their implementation.
2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the
Government of India taking the following actions if
any militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not
accept this framework of proposals for a settlement,
namely,
(a) India will take all necessary steps to
ensure that Indian territory is not used for activities
prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka.
(b) The Indian Navy / Coast guard will co -
operate with the Sri Lanka Navy in preventing
Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri Lanka.
(c) In the event that the Government of Sri
Lanka requests the Government of India to afford
military assistance to implement these proposals
the Government of India will co-operate by giving to
the Governrnent of Sri Lanka such military
assistance as and when requested.
(d) The Government of India will expedite
repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to
India who are resident there, concurrently with the
repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from Tamil
Nadu.
(e) The Government of Sri Lanka and India
will co - operate in ensuring the physical security
and safety of all communities inhabiting the
Northern and Eastern Provinces.
2.17 The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure
free, full and fair participation of voters from all
communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces
in electoral processes envisaged in this Agreement.
The Government of India will extend full co-operation
to the Government of Sri Lanka in this regard.
2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be
Sinhala. Tamil and English will also be official
languages.
3 This Agreement and the annexure thereto
shall come into force upon signature.
In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals here
unto. Done in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty - ninth
day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty -
seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally authentic.
JUNIUS RICHARD RAJIV GANDHI
JAYEWARDENE Prime Minister of the
President of the Democratic Republic of India
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Annexure to the Agreement
1. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka and
the Prime Minister of India agree that the Referendum
mentioned in paragraph and its sub-paragraphs of the
Agreement will be observed by a representative of the
Election Commission of India to be invited by His
Excellency the President of Sri Lanka.
2. Similarly, both heads of Government agree
that the elections to the Provincial Council mentioned
in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be observed by
a representative of the Government of India to be
invited by the President of Sri Lanka.
3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka
agrees that the Home Guards would be disbanded and all
para-militazy personnel will be withdrawn from the
Eastern and Northern provinces with a view to creating
conditions conducive to fair elections to the Council.
4. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime
Minister of India agree that the Tamil militants shall
surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon to be
designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The
surrender shall take place in the presence of one
senior representative each of Sri Lanka Red Cross and
the Indian Red Cross.
5. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime Minister
of India agree that a joint Indo - Sri Lanka observer group
consisting of qualified representatives of the Government of
Sri Lanka and the Government of India would monitor the
cessation of hosülities fi om 31 July 1987.
6. The President of Sri Lanka and the Prime
Minister of India also agree that in terms of paragraph
2.14 and paragraph 2.16 (c) of the Agreement, an
Indian peace keeping contingent may be invited by the
President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the
cessation of hostilities.
President of Sri Lanka
29 July 1987
Excellency,
Please refer to your letter dated 29 July 1987, which
reads as follows: Excellency,
1. Conscious of the friendship between our two
countries stretching over two millenia and more, and
recognising the importance of nurturing this
traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri
Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our
respective territories to be used for activities
prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial intergrity
and security.
2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of
our discussions, agreed to meet some of India's
concerns as follows:
(I) Your Excellency and myself will reach
an early understanding about the relevance and
employment of foreign military and intelligence
personnel with a view to ensuring that such
presences will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan
relations.
(II) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri
Lanka will not be made available for military use by
any country in a manner prejudicial to India's
interests.
(III) The work of restoring and operating
the Trincomalee oil tank farm will be undertaken as
a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka.
(IV) Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign
broadcasting organisations will be revlewed to
ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri
Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting
facilities and not for any military or intelligence
purposes.
(I) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are
found to be engaging in terrorist activlties or
advocating separatism or secessionism.
(II) Provide training facilities and military
supplies for Sri Lankan security forces.
4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a
joint consultation mechanism to continuously revlew
matters of common concern in the light of the
objectives stated in para. I, and specifically to monitor
the implementation of other matters contained in this
letter.
5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above
correctly sets out the Agreement reached between us.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest
consideration.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) Rajiv Gandhi.
LALITH'S MURDEROUS CYNICISM
An important portion from: Bruce Palling. "An
`Independent' view from London:"
"Athulathmudali's most influential role was his period as
National Security Minister between 1984 and 1989. He was
the only cabinet minister who positively relished his
dealings with the press. He was willing to diseuss any topic
but was only available to make appointments between 5:30
and 6 in the morning when he would invariably pick up the
telephone himself. A man of immense charm, he was also
capable of ruthless behaviour. Easily the most intelligent
government minister, he could be shockingly frank.
"During the abortive 1987 peace agreement,
Athulathmudali insisted that the Indian army hand over
some Tamil Tigers they arrested in the Palk Straits en route
to India. Half of the captives subsequently committed
suicide, which then widened the conflict as the Tigers
directly attacked the Indian army in Northern Sri Lanka.
When I said to Athulathmudali that he must have known
this would occur, he readily agreed, saying that is was
exactly what he wanted to happen, in order to have India on
his side."
Bruce Palling, "An Independent view from London."
The Sunday Ttmes, 2.5.93, reproduced from Independent
(London)
It is clearly euident that the National Security Minister Mr.
Lalith Athulathmudali and the Jayewardene gouernment
planned and acted calculated to break the Indv - Lanka
Agreement of 1987. The Agreement and peace process were
entirely broken with this momentous incident. This time too,
the Sinhalese leaders broke their agreement.
Dixit blames the Sinhalese for the breaking of the
Indo - Lanka Accord:
"TAMIL HOPES NOT MET"
"the first pulling back from the commitments given was
from the Sinhalese side."
Mr. Joytindra Nath Dixit, India's pipe - smoking
controversial former High Commissioner in Colombo and
later foreign Secretary feels that the legitimate Tamil
aspirations will lead Sri Lanka to face a choice between
unity and division.
A man known not to mince his words, Mr. Dixit who
came to Sri Lanka during a volatile period in Indo - Lanka
relations and the ethnic crisis was soon dubbed as the
Viceroy of India by critics for his outspoken style.
Now in retirement Mr.Dixit looks back at those turbulent
times and the cloak - and - dagger politics behind the Indo -
Lanka Agreement.
Q. You said earlier that the Accord failed to reach its full
potential because both the governments and the militants
did not stick to their obligations. What in your view
actually went wrong and at what point?
A: (Laughs) I could speak for half a day. The entire
period between the end of September 1987 and middle of
October was full of gaps in communication and pulling back
from commitments from both sides. But even if I become a
little unpopular with your government, the first pulling
back from commitments given was from the Sinhalese side.
They delayed in giving the due status to the Tamil
language. They got involved in what you call delaying and
desultory discussions about devolution of financial power.
So, the LTTE and other Tamils felt it was again the same
situation as it was before the APC and 1983. That was one.
But the one incident which really resulted in the LTTE
backing out and India having to go into military operations
was the late Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali's insistence of
bringing those 17 LTTE youngsters back to Colombo
whereas whatever they did, they had been captured and
they could have been left in the custody of the Indian forces.
We could have negotiated something. In fact Mr. J. R.
Jayewardene had agreed that was the wisest political move
but then Mr. Athulathmudali had other plans and while Mr.
Jayewardena was still passing instructions.
Athulathmudali sent off the planes to prevent yòur
President's decision being conveyed to me. Those boys took
cyanide. It was very tragic and the LTTE leadership's reaction
was naturally that of hurt and anger. Some sort of a betrayal.
It is fascinating and I feel very sad about it that in their
propaganda, they have accused me of not having helped
them get these peple released. I was in Delhi when this
incident happened. I rushed back to Colombo and I
managed with difficulty to persuade your President to be
understanding about it but then you can't sit in value
judgement about things that have happened.
Q: Did this situation arise in your view due
to International politics in Sri Lanka?
A: Of course. yes. No doubt about it that
President Jayewardena had to make a bold and
imaginative stand about this Agreement.
There was a lot of opposition to him within the
cabinet. Mr. Gamini Jayasuriya, Mr. Lalith
Athulathmudali and Mr. Premadasa
disassociated themselves completely from the
Agreement.
The Sunday Leader, Sept. 4, l994.
THE HALF - BAKED SOLUTION OF THE INDO-SRI LANKA
ACCORD OF l987. WAS A TACTICAL AND A DIPLOMATIC
MOVE OF THE JAYAWARDENE GOVERNMENT TO TACKLE AND DEFEAT THE EELAMARMED STRUGGLE OF THE TAMILS FO TAMIL EELAM WITH THE HELP OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT
MR. JAYAWARDENE VERY TACTFULLY TRAPPED MR. RAJN
GANDHI INTO THE WElR AGAINST THE EELAM TAMILS, WHO
WERE THE TRADlTÌONAL FRIENDS OF INDIA.
HERE, ONCE AGAIN THE PROMISE WAS BROKEN BY
THE SINHALESE GOVERNMENT, BUT IT WAS DIFFERENT IN
CERTAIN ASPECTS. UP TO l987, THE SINHALESE
LEADERS BROKE THE PLEDGES, WHICH WERE GIVEN TO
THE TAMIL LEADERS, BUT THIS TIME THE PROMISE THAT
WlS GIVEN TO INDIA, TOO, WAS BROKEN BY THE
SINHALESE LEADERS.
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE ACCORD, THE
JÁYEWARDENE GOVERNMENT WAS VERY KEEN AND
PLANNED TO BREAK IT. MR. JAYAWARDENE AND HIS
LIEUTENANTS WERE DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY
INVOLVED IN CREATING THE CONDITION STEP BY STEP TO
MANOEUVRE INDIA TO INTERVENE THE EELAM.
THE STATEMENTS OF THE FORMER NATIONAL
SECURITY MINISTER OF SRI LANKA, MR. LALITH
ATHULATHMUDALI, AND THE FORMER "VICEROY" OF
INDIA TO SRI LANKA, MR. J.N. DIXIT CLEARLYPROVE HOW
THE JAYEWARDENE GOVERNMENT BROKE THE ACCORD.
FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MANIFESTO OF
MR. GAMINI DISSANAYAKE:
( 1994)
"UNFORTUNATELY, LACK OF POLITICAL WILL AND AN
INADEl,UACY OF THE POWERS UNDER THE l3TH
AMENDMENT HAVE FRUSTRATED THE PEOPLE OF THE
NOR TH-EAST. "
HERE, THE U.N.P. AGREES THAT THE PEACE PACKAGE
OF 1987 WAS NOT COMPLETE ENOUGH TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEMS OF THE TAMILS.
'Cited in Jehan Perera "Gamini's last Testament was Federalism",
the Island, 13.11.1994.