posted January 08, 2001 01:52 PM         

By Sandaruwan Madduma Bandara

Introduction
This paper is based on a full-length work (forthcoming), which contains a comprehensive chronology of significant incidents relating to the ethnic conflict since 1948. The arguments presented in the paper, to the extent that they are dependent on historical facts, draw from this chronology, the inclusion of which is beyond its scope. A primary assumption is made, that the ethnic conflict did not begin in 1983, but rather even before 1948. It attempts to make a few basic assertions. First among them is the argument that many of the factors cited as having heightened the ethnic conflict did not in fact have a significant impact. This is primarily due to the fact that Tamil militancy and separatist agitation predate those incidents that are cited. Secondly it discusses the scope of legitimate Tamil aspirations, limitation of negotiations and the issue of the true representatives of the Tamils. The paper concludes with a brief look to the future.

Historical Aspect
The facts about the ethnic conflict have become mired in a mass of falsehoods and allegations. The parties to the conflict have made a variety of claims, many of which are baseless, in order to justify their actions or further their own agendas. In order to clarify this situation it is useful to identify historical inflection points. The issue of plantation Tamils is a natural starting point.

Plantation Tamils
Attempts have been made to claim, 1. that the treatment of plantation Tamils was discriminatory, and 2. that such treatment contributed to the escalation of the ethnic conflict. Both assertions are false. Perhaps what is important to note here is that the plantation Tamils are a distinct sub-ethnic group whose political aspirations have been entirely different from Tamils of Jaffna origins (Hoole et al, 1992).

The first Tamil labour was brought to Ceylon by the British in 1823 (Swamy, 1991). Therefore, as far as the 1 million plantation Tamils in Sri Lanka in 1948 were concerned, the issue of a traditional homeland does not arise. Further, it was generally understood that they were immigrant labourers and most of them were expected to return home once the British left.

The Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, the India Pakistan Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949, and The Ceylon Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act of 1949 contributed towards officially classifying the plantation Tamils as temporary immigrants (Nithiyanandam, 1999). Several factors prompted the passing of this legislation. It prevented the unchecked influx of immigrant labour. To some extent it was passed to protect the interests of the Kandyan peasantry whose lands had been taken by the British to establish plantations (Vittachi, 1958). And further, the ruling UNP used the opportunity to politically combat a potential threat from the Left Wing (Somasunderam, 1999, Wijesinghe, Sri Lanka in Crisis, 1991). The ruling had the backing of many Tamil MPs in Parliament, including that of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (Swamy). At the time of the legislation there were over ½ million Ceylon Moors, 45,000 Burghers and 7,000 Britons in the Island who were also affected by this legislation. The Burghers and Britons left the Island gradually (Vittachi). They did not engage in a separatist struggle. Nor did the Moors who remained. Therefore, the Citizenship Act can in no way be seen in simplistic terms of Sinhalese discrimination against Tamils.

Although plantation Tamils have come under attack during the ethnic riots (notably 1983), this has not significantly soured their relationship with the State. The problems of the plantation Tamils have always been of an economic nature, and their struggle has been against the capitalist owners of plantations. This is a legacy that was inherited from the British. Through the representation of Saumyamoorthy Thondaman, the plantation Tamils have always had a strong voice in the Sri Lankan Government, particularly after 1977.

Any significance given to the treatment of plantation Tamils as having contributed towards exacerbating the ethnic problem, therefore, can be largely discarded. Further, none of the Tamil terrorist groups, nor political parties, can claim to even distantly represent the plantation Tamils. And as such whatever demands these parties make, they cannot make them on behalf of the plantation Tamils. To the extent that privilege lies with a single political party, it lies with the CWC. Although the CWC came under the TUF umbrella in 1977, at this point the collective resolution for a separate state rings false. A separate state in the Northern and Eastern part of the country in no way benefits the plantation Tamils. In fact achievement of Eelam would probably mean the exile of many plantation Tamils from the central hills to their new homeland. Therefore, claims that the creation of a separate Tamil state would solve the problems of plantation Tamils are entirely without basis.

The Origins of Eelamist Ideology

There can be no doubt that the dream of Tamil Eelam within Sri Lankan territory began even before independence (Guneratne, 1998 & 1999). The active organization to establish Tamil Eelam began with Chelvanayagam’s defection from the Tamil Congress and the formation of “Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchchi” (ITAK) in 1949. The party was called “The Federal Party” to mislead those who did not understand Tamil. The principal resolution adopted by the Federal Party at its inception, contained the following:

“We believe that the only means of ensuring that the Tamils are guaranteed their freedom and self respect by law, and of solving their problems in a just and democratic manner is to permit them to have their own autonomous state guaranteeing self-government and self-determination for the Tamil nation in the country: and to work indefatigably to the attainment of this objective” (De Silva, K.M.)

The Federal Party further emphasised its intent to struggle for a separate state in a resolution at its first national convention at Trincomalee in 1951 (Swamy). On May 14, 1976 the TUF passed a resolution calling for a separate state (Guneratne, Indian Intervention, 1994).

Evolution of the Ethnic Conflict:

A large number of instances have been cited as having given rise to the Ethnic Problem. This paper concentrates on those incidents that are considered to have contributed to the separatist struggle. It must be kept in mind that the separatist struggle and the ethnic conflict are not one and the same thing.

It is interesting to note that in many cases Tamil terrorism or separatist activism predates those incidents, which are cited as having caused them. Therefore in some instances it is reasonable to conclude that actions either by the Sinhalese people in general or by the State were in fact provoked by Tamil extremists and not vice versa. Further it is reasonable to assume that Tamil terrorism would have occurred by itself, whether the Sinhalese people discriminated against them or not.

Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956:

Perhaps the single action by the State which was not directly provoked by Tamil activism was Bandaranaike’s Sinhala Only Policy of 1956. It was prompted by many factors, first among which was Bandaranaike’s unbridled ambition. However, the Sinhala Only policy was also a reaction to British Colonial rule and an attempt to redress the grievances of the Sinhalese majority (Kumaratunga, Chandrika, 2000). It is interesting to note Dixit’s comments in Assignment Colombo:

“[The British] also played on the apprehensions of the Tamil minority and used them as an instrument in their colonial regime. Another contributory factor to the good British-Tamil equation was the British familiarity with the Tamils because of their century-old connections with the Coromandal coast of India. The result was that Tamils became disproportionately influential in the management of Sri Lankan political and economic affairs right till the time of the country’s independence despite their being a minority. Tamils also became economically dominant because of their association with colonial rulers and their comparatively aggressive entrepreneurship. So the historical, ethnic and religious antagonism was compounded by the Sinhalese feeling of being discriminated against and unfairly treated by the British with the support of the Tamils” (Dixit, 1998).

Further, “Sinhala Only” was an attempt to hold-in-check the left-wing element of Bandaranaike’s Government which wanted to nationalize foreign owned tea estates, insurance companies and banks (Vittachi).

In 1956 30% of the employees of the Ceylon Administrative Service, 50% of the Clerical Service, 60% of Professionals (engineers, doctors, lecturers), 40% of the armed forces and 40% of labour forces were Tamils (Shwarz, 1988, cited in Somasundaram). This clearly represents an apartheid-like situation. To the extent that the Sinhala Only or similar policies mitigated this situation, they cannot be found fault with.

It is unnecessary to iterate the number of multi-ethnic countries that use the language of the majority as the official language. It is also unnecessary to iterate that since Sinhalese form 74% of the population in Sri Lanka, there can be absolutely no question of the fairness of a Sinhala Only policy. What is important to recognize is that the manner in which the Sinhala language was given primacy was hasty, and insensitive to the dignity of the Tamils who had become comfortable in a position of excessive privilege.

The Riots of 1958:

The ethnic riots that took place in 1958 were a strange phenomenon. Many prominent persons including the Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonetillake, claimed that they had been incited by agents provocateur (Vittachi). Certainly two of the agents provocateur were Bandaranaike and Chelvanayakam (who had taken temporary residence upon the Galle Face green at the time). However, the widespread nature of the riots and the level of organization of mobs, both Sinhalese and Tamil, give a disturbing indication that there was more at work than just hot-blooded feelings among ethnic groups. It is highly interesting to note that the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) had set up a station in Colombo just five years previously (in 1953). Further, Nehru had visited Sri Lanka with the spy master R. N. Kao in 1956 (Guneratne, Indian Intervention, 1998). This may be called an unfounded conspiracy theory. However, it must not be forgotten that India had also set up a spy station in Dacca in the same year. And that was only the initiation of a massive Indian operation that culminated in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971. In any event it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate in detail a possible role India played in inciting the riots of 1958.

The second disturbing aspect of the 1958 riots is the organized Tamil terrorist element. The first Tamil terrorists emerged at these riots. They were armed with hand bombs and were even capable of returning fire upon the Army and Police personnel. A mob of 200 attacked the Naga Vihare in Jaffna and many Sinhalese shops were burned. The Buddhist temple at Nagadipa was destroyed in a well planned dynamite attack. The Governor General also claimed that a powerful radio transmitter was being used by Tamil terrorists. Government offices at Kayts and Velvettithurai were attacked, records burned and firearms stolen. This last was interpreted as an attempt to subvert the civil administration in these areas and the first steps in setting up a separate state. In a statement to the press, the Governor General said, “Gentlemen, if any of you have an idea that this was a spontaneous outburst of communalism, you can disabuse your minds of it. This is the work of a Master Mind who has been at the back of the people who have planned this carefully and knew exactly what they were doing. It was a time-bomb set about two years ago which has now exploded” (Vittachi). Even unfounded rumours of Sinhalese atrocities in the South were spread with a great deal of sophistication (perhaps Indian agents contributed in this respect). The Sinhalese mobs in these riots were for the most part armed only with farming implements. Tamil terrorists can thus be differentiated because they were armed with relatively more dangerous weapons and displayed a high degree of organization. It is a blatant misrepresentation to call what happened in 1958, anti-Tamil riots. They were ethnic riots with both Sinhala and Tamil persons engaging in large scale violence against members of the other ethnic group.

As is clear from the evidence Tamil separatist terrorism already existed in 1958, well before many of the State actions that allegedly led to the creation of the ethnic conflict. Further, when Tamil politicians walked into Tamil refugee camps, they were mobbed and accused of having brought the Tamil people to this situation with their petty political agendas (Vittachi).

At this point in time ITAK (‘Federal Party’) had four demands:

1) a federal constitution,

2) parity for Tamil and Sinhala languages,

3) repeal of existing citizenship laws and,

4) an end to colonisation of “Tamil areas” by Sinhalese (Swamy).

Since the ITAK was already committed to establishing a separate state, granting fedaralism was out of the question. The language issue has already been dealt with. As for the repeal of existing citizenship laws, which primarily affected plantation Tamils, it is highly questionable whether Chelvayagam had any legitimate right to make this demand. If the plantation Tamils were aggrieved at the citizenship laws, their representative should have made this demand, not Chelvanayakam.

Colonisation:

The issue of “colonization” of so-called traditional Tamil homelands deserves some attention. The only region of the country that can in any way be considered a traditional Tamil homeland is the Jaffna peninsula. The Eastern province cannot by the furthest stretch of imagination be considered a traditional Tamil homeland.

The separatists have absolutely no claim to the Eastern province. The population breakdown for the province is 42.12% Tamils, 32.28% Muslims and 24.92% Sinhalese (Census Report, 1981). Further, of the 22 AGA divisions in the districts of Trincomalee and Ampara, the Sinhalese constitute a majority in 10 of them; Padavi-Sripura, Gomarakadawela, Kantalai, Morawewa, Seruvila in Trincomalee and Weagam Pattu North, Wewagam Pattu South, Panama Pattu, Bintenne Pattu North and Bintenne Pattu South in Ampara. The Tamils constitute the majority in only two AGA divisions; Trincomalee Town and Gravets, and Thirukkovil (Gunesekera). Any Tamil separatist making claims in the Eastern province based on Tamil population can therefore lay claim only to those two AGA divisions. The fact that this distribution of the races was not caused by post-independence ‘colonisation’ schemes is born out by studies such as “An Appraisal of the Concept of a Traditional Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka” by Prof. G. H. Peiris. The study clearly shows that the Sinhala majority in much of the Eastern province dates back at least as far as 1921.

Perhaps the fact that the Eastern Province is a traditional Sinhala homeland can be most easily illustrated by examining the name of the capital city of the province, Trincomalee. At the time when it was an Aryan settlement, Trincomalee was called Gokarnatheertha. Later through several evolutions this became Gokanna and finally Gona. The Tamils pronounce Gona as Kona. Thiru means sacred and malai means hill. Essentially Thiru-kona-malai means “the sacred hill of Gona” (Vimalananda). The name Trincomalee is simply a translation from the original Sinhalese.

If any ethnic group should therefore be accused of having engaged in colonizing activity in the Eastern province, it is the Tamils. Chelvanayakam claiming that the Sinhalese were “colonizing” Tamil areas is tantamount to white Americans complaining that Red Indians were stealing their lands. In any event, when the first new settlements were established under the Gal Oya scheme, Senanayake made the first offer to the residents of the area who happened to be Tamils. Only when this offer was turned down were persons from other areas given the opportunity to come and settle there (Somasunderam, 1999). In 1957 the Minister of Lands even made arrangements for 400 Tamil families to be settled in the Padaviya area (Vittachi). Further, in examining the demographics of actual colonizing made by the state, it is clear that a large number of Tamils were also included (Gunesekera, S.L.).

Inciting Rebellion:

It is clear that the primary cause of the heightened ethnic tensions during these early years was the antagonism of the ITAK (Federal Party). In essence it was acting contrary to the best interests of the Tamil people in an attempt to further it’s own political influence. “Tamils who had never taken an active role in politics suffered so much physically and spiritually that they began blaming their plight on the ‘Federal Party’” (Vittachi). In 1957 the Federal Party was finally proscribed after it stepped well beyond the boundaries of a political party and began to behave like a quasi-terrorist organization. In 1959 Chelvanayakam organized a satyagraha campaign that drew massive crowds to the streets. Many of them were Sinhalese (Swamy). Even in this respect it is clear that while Chelvanayakam had a great deal of support, it was not fundamentally of an ethnic nature. Chelvanayakam even inaugurated an independent postal service, which led to his arrest (Swamy). It is evident that he acted in an unnecessarily provocative manner and much of the time he was not trying to win anything for the Tamils; he was merely trying to augment his own image.

By 1961 a group called Pulip Padai (Army of Tigers) had formed to carry on an armed rebellion against the Sinhalese state. They had been influenced by Leon Uris' Exodus (Swamy). They distributed leaflets advocating militancy. The Tigers also floated a trawler company in Colombo to smuggle arms into the country (Guneratne, Ethnic Conflict, 1998). In 1963 a prominent campaign for separatism in Tamil Nadu induced Nehru to bring in the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of India. The Amendment made it mandatory for all those running for office to take an oath to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India (Guneratne, Indian Intervention). In 1966 Senanayake passed legislation to provide official status to Tamil in the North and East. The ITAK (‘Federal Party’) welcomed the move and celebrated Sri Lanka’s Independence Day for the 1st time in over ten years. To win the Elections in May 1970 Mrs. Bandaranaike engaged in an all out anti-Tamil campaign. "Dudley bade, masala wade" was an SLFP slogan against the UNP prime minister. The elections also saw a decline in the number of votes polled by ITAK (‘Federal Party’), (Swamy). In 1970 the Indian IB agents in Colombo were replaced by RAW operatives (Guneratne, Indian Intervention). Thangadurai had acquired .22 and .38 revolvers and was also organizing the local manufacture of revolvers. Some of these would later be seized in police raids in 1973. In September 1970 Suvakumaran attempted to assassinate Sri Lankan deputy minister for Cultural Affairs Somaweera Chandrasiri (Swamy).

In 1971 the JVP rebellion took place. During the same year, after having armed and assisted the Mukthi Bahini rebels in East Pakistan, India invaded and created Bangaldesh (Swamy). Both events gave Tamil seperatists ideas. They realized that,

1) they could successfully fight the government in an armed struggle, and

2) there was precedent to creating a “separate” state in South East Asia.

In February 1971, Sivakumaran attempted to assassinate the mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah. In April 1971 while Thangadurai and 15 others were making explosives at the Thondamanar high school, a bomb went off seriously injuring Chinna Sothi (Swamy). It is clear that well before the education standardization policies were adopted, Tamil terrorists were active. In some instances, such as that of the Pulip Pudai, terrorists had been active for nearly ten years before the standardization policy came into effect. Therefore the natural conclusion to draw here, concerning much of the Tamil terrorism before 1972 is that it was prompted more by the criminal nature of the principal actors, rather than any ideological inspiration.

The TUF Demands:

On May 22, 1972 Bandaranaike passed a republican constitution and Ceylon became Sri Lanka. Sinhala and Buddhism were given a special place in the constitution. Many Tamil MP’s walked out of the constituent assembly when the constitution was adopted. The Tamil Federal Party, Tamil Congress and Thondaman's Ceylon Worker's Congress formed the Tamil United Front (TUF). TUF had six demands from the government;

1) a defined place for the Tamil language,

2) Sri Lanka should be a secular state,

3) the administration should be decentralised,

4) the fundamental rights of the minorities should be written into the constitution,

5) the caste system should be abolished,

6) citizenship should be granted to all those who seek it (Swamy).

While the first four demands were relatively reasonable, the last two border on the fantastic. It is no secret that the caste system among Tamil society, based around Jaffna, has been a highly discriminatory and oppressive institution. Caste problems among Tamils have always been far more pronounced than in Sinhalese society. However, the identification of the Caste system is significant since it is undoubtedly one of the principal causes of the terrorist problem. Tamil terrorists and separatists have for the most part come from a low caste background. In fact many of the Tamils murdered by Tamil terrorists have been from high castes. What is important to note here is that the Sri Lankan state was being held responsible for the perpetuation of the caste system. And this was implicitly being given as one of the causes of the ethnic conflict! There is perhaps no greater sign of the hypocrisy of Tamil politicians than the position taken on this issue.

The final demand was also clearly unreasonable. No country in the world offers open citizenship. Among other things it would create an unmanageable situation in terms of population growth through immigration. In Sri Lanka it would simply reverse the positive results achieved through the Citizenship Acts in the first place. In a country already troubled by high unemployment rates, open immigration of cheap labour from India would only compound the problem. Further, the grievances of the Kandyan peasantry, which have never been adequately redressed by a Sri Lankan Government, would increase once more. Finally in a country with ethnic problems, population ratios play a key role. If South Indian labourers were permitted to become citizens unchecked, the ratio of plantation Tamils in the population would skyrocket. This would give them a political clout beyond what they deserve. After considering these facts it becomes evident that the last demand would only have resulted in intensifying the ethnic conflict.

University Standardisation:

In 1972 University Standardisation was introduced to make University admissions more equitable. The ratio of Sinhalese to Tamils in the population was 7:1. Unregulated, the ratio of Sinhalese to Tamil students in University was 1:1 in many important faculties like Medicine and Engineering. Specifically in 1972 the percentage of Tamils in the Physical, Biological and Architecture faculties was 31%, 35% in Engineering, 42% in Medicine and 38% in Agriculture and Veterinary Sciences (Manogaran, 1987 cited in Somasunderam).

The disproportionate number of Tamils in University was partly due to various malpractices by Tamil examiners in marking A/L papers, racially discriminating at practical examinations and leaking examinations related material to Tamil students before the exams (Wageeshwaracharya, Sri Saddharma, 1978). Even if these activities did not significantly impact the number of Tamils qualifying for University, access to a free education system must be equitable. If this means that admissions must be on a basis other than merit, it is only one of the practical realities that administrators face.

The primary focus of the standardization policy was to allow more students from rural and underprivileged districts the opportunity to get higher education. There were large discrepancies in teacher salaries between urban schools and rural schools. This meant that rural students were systematically receiving a lower quality education than urban students. Standardisation was not specifically intended to regulate the ethnic ratios of university entrants, although this was one of the consequences. In the final analysis Tamil students have always been the most highly privileged group in terms of access to higher education. Although standardization had a marginal impact on the admission of Tamil students, they continue to enjoy far more access to national universities than any other ethnic group (De Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind, 1999, Gunesekera, S.L., and Somasunderam). This is particularly true of the engineering and medical faculties. Any person claiming that Tamils were or continue to be discriminated against in university admissions is either a Tamil chauvinist or inadequately informed on this issue.

University standardisation has been cited as one of the most significant factors that heightened the ethnic conflict. However, in this paper I have conclusively illustrated that Tamil separatism and terrorism was in evidence at least fourteen years prior to the introduction of university standardisaton policies.

The Rise of Terrorism:

On June 5, 1974 a 17 year old boy named Sivakumaran was trapped by police while trying to rob a bank in Jaffna and committed suicide by taking a cyanide pill. In the same year Tamil militants pulled off their first successful ‘bank robbery’. Rs. 91,000 were taken from the Multipurpose Cooperative Society of Telipallai. It was in 1974 that the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) became active under the leadership of Chetti Balasingham (Swamy).

There were massive protests against the Prime Minister when she visited Jaffna to open a University faculty. The visit was preceded by several incidents of violence that were attributed to the TNT. Another bomb was detonated at the home of Bandaranaike’s interpreter. Another attempt on Duraiappah’s life took the form of a dynamite attack that caused extensive damage to a railway station. Bombs were exploded in the Jaffna Grand Bazaar and CTB buses were burned. Elections were held in February 1975 for the Kankasanthurai seat. Chelvanayakam won an outstanding victory in his electorate and declared that is was a mandate from the Tamil people for a free Tamil Eelam.

On July 1975 Alfred Duriappah, the Tamil mayor of Jaffna (SLFP) was assassinated by four young men while he was going to temple. The assailants used the Mayor’s car to escape. Three of the four men were caught in a police manhunt. The fourth got away. He was Velupillai Prabhakaran.

This is one of the key inflection points in the history of the conflict. Up to this point, what existed in Sri Lanka was an ethnic issue that was being exploited by unscrupulous politicians to further their own ends. From this point on Tamil terrorism becomes widespread and in fact causes the ethnic problem to recede to the background. In a famous remark President D.B. Wijetunge once said, “There is no ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. There is only a terrorist problem.” It is important to recognize the fact that there is both an ethnic problem and a terrorist problem. They are distinct and don’t have a lot in common. Addressing one in no way means that the other is being addressed.

1976-1983:

Around 150 Tamil terrorists were trained in Lebanon, beginning in 1976. On March 5th, Prabhakaran led an armed raid on the People’s Bank at Puttur and got away with half a million rupees cash and Rs. 200,000 worth of jewellery (Swamy).

At the elections in Sri Lanka in 1977, J. R. Jayawardena promised a free market economy if voted to power. He promised to address Tamil grievances in,

1) Education,

2) Colonisation,

3) Use of Tamil as a language,

4) Employment in public and semi-public corporations (Guneratne, Indian Intervention).

At the 1977 elections the TULF swept the seats it contested in the North and East and Amirthalingam was allowed to become the Leader of the Opposition. In terms of votes at the national level the SLFP polled a higher number than the TULF. Therefore there was always an argument for making Mrs. Bandaranaike the Leader of the Opposition (De Silva, J.R. Jayawardena). The decision to make Amirthalingam the Leader of the Opposition was one of the key errors of judgement made by the UNP Government. Amirthalingam used his new power and influence to take the ethnic problem to a new level of intensity.

In 1977 armed terrorists shot policemen in several incidents when the police attempted to seize arms from them in the North. Jayawardena ordered troops to the North. On August 15th and 16th “mobs of Tamil thugs took to the streets of Jaffna attacking, looting and burning State institutions, buildings and property as well as the businesses of Sinhalese residents of the peninsula.” (Gunesekera, S.L.). The racist election propaganda of the TULF was at least in part responsible for fanning the communal violence. The 1977 ethnic riots, which started in this manner, left some 300 Tamils dead and 40,000 as refugees. For the first time Tamil Nadu started becoming publicly sympathetic and the DMK party organised a strike (Swamy).

From 1977 onwards a large number of liberal Tamil public figures were murdered by LTTE and other militant groups. As such the limited number of senior Tamil politicians in Sri Lanka is hardly due to Sinhalese discrimination; but rather due to murder by the LTTE and other Tamil terrorist groups. On January 27th 1978 Uma Maheshwaran and Vellupillai Prabhakaran entered Colombo and shot M. Canagaratnam, a TULF MP who had crossed over to the UNP.

On September 7, 1978 the LTTE blew up an Air Ceylon Avro 748 killing 35 passengers at Ratmalana airport. One of the two men responsible for the blast was S. Subramaniam alias Baby. After the blast he was known as ‘Avro Baby’. The TULF increased its campaign for an independent Eelam. J. R. Jayewardene brought in the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which granted the State widespread power in counteracting terrorism. On 6th of May, five men shot and killed K. Pathmanathan, OIC of the District Crime Detective Bureau of the Jaffna Police, at his residence in front of his children. Amirthalingam had called Pathmanathan a “traitor” a few months earlier at an open court (Swamy).

In 1979 ethnic riots broke out again.

1981 was a key year because it was the last time a population census was held in Sri Lanka. 12.6% of the population of Sri Lanka consisted of Sri Lankan Tamils. 5.56% were Indian Tamils (Census Report 1981). The 1981 census further showed that 53.2% of all Tamils in Sri Lanka live outside the Northern and Eastern provinces.

On May 24th gunmen shot A. Thiagaraja, a UNP candidate at the District Development Council elections. On May 31st PLOTE gunmen opened fire on a TULF meeting near Jaffna. Two policemen were killed in the attack (Swamy).

Policemen on election duty, retaliated by burning down the Jaffna library which contained 97,000 books. Ethnic riots broke out again. Gamini Dissanayake extended an apology in Parliament, claiming, “I think we are all responsible” (Swamy). Tamil politicians encouraged frustrated youth in the North and East to join terrorist groups (Guneratne, Indian Intervention).

On April 29th the first anti-TULF hartal was held to protest the party’s participation in the opening ceremony of the new Parliament building at Kotte. On May 19th 1982, Prabhakaran and Raghavan attempted to murder Uma and Kannan as they were getting on a motor cycle outside a restaurant at the Pondy Bazaar in Madras. The two sides exchanged fire and all four were arrested. At the time of the arrests Prabharakan was wanted by the Sri Lankan government for eighteen murders and Uma for nine (Swamy). Chandrahasan, a lawyer and senior member of the TULF flew to Madras to defend the two terrorists. Together with Lawyers from Congress I, AIADMK and DMK, the extradition of these men to Sri Lanka was prevented (Guneratne, Indian Intervention).

On October 27th 1982 LTTE virtually annihilated the Chavakachcheri police station. They were armed with a G-3, a repeater rifle, two revolvers, a Sub Machine Guns and grenades. (Swamy) .

On January 26th students from Jaffna University carried out a demonstration in the town demanding the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the release of suspected terrorists who were in custody. A general strike was observed on February 4th – this was instigated by Tamil racist parties like the TULF (Swamy).

Training and arming of Tamil terrorists in Tamil Nadu was well under way by 1983. Indira Gandhi supported these activities through the Indian intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). India's Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office provided diplomatic and political support to Tamil Militant groups in Tamil Nadu and helped to tarnish Sri Lanka's image on the international front. India’s support to Sri Lankan Tamil terrorists was called “The Sri Lanka Operation” and was headed by RN Kao (Guneratne).

On the night of July 23, 1983 an army patrol code named "Four Four Bravo" comprising of 15 men left the Gurenagar camp in a jeep and a half truck. It was ambushed at Tinneveli, near Jaffna University. Mines were detonated under the leading jeep and the soldiers massacred by the LTTE using grenades and automatic fire. The entire LTTE leadership, including Prabhakaran, Kittu, Chellakilli, Iyer, Victor, Pulendran, Santhosam and Appiah took part in the operation (Swamy). It was in this manner that the ethnic riots of July 1983 were brilliantly engineered by the LTTE. It is probable that they had help at least in planning from the Indian RAW. On July 24 the rioting began. Some 80,000 Tamils fled to refugee camps and later to Tamil regions, India and the West (Swamy).

At the time of this incident none of the Tamil terrorist groups had more than 50 members. The discussion of historical incidents in this paper will be limited up to 1983. Incidents after 1983 are far too numerous and it is beyond the scope of this paper. Further, whatever causal factors of the ethnic conflict must be analysed before the 1983 riots. After that point the Sri Lankan state was at war with domestic terrorists. The atrocities committed by soldiers against civilians from 1983 onwards cannot be cited as having caused the ethnic or terrorist problem.

Indian Interference in Sri Lanka’s Internal Affairs:

Dixit tries to justify Indian interference in Sri Lankan internal affairs by citing several actions taken by J.R. Jayawardene between 1977-83:

1) Receiving Pakistani and Israeli help in fighting the terrorist problem. For a small country like Sri Lanka that had for the most part only a ceremonial army at the time, it was a natural move to seek help from benevolent foreign nations. The simple fact that these countries may have been enemies of India in no way justifies an assumption on the part of the Indian government that Sri Lanka was engaging in an anti-Indian buildup on her Southern flank. It is obvious perhaps even to the most asinine Indian politician that Sri Lanka was in fact trying to do what it said it was trying to do; deal with a terrorist problem in the northern part of the country and nothing more.

2) Signing an agreement with the USA to set up a Voice of America broadcasting station in Chilaw. Of this Dixit says, “the Government of India had definite information that it would also be a base for electronic intelligence operations.” This is as open an admission of carrying out espionage activities in Sri Lanka or the US as one is likely to get. Dixit, who tries to portray himself as such a suave player in real politik, seems unnaturally sensitive to the fact that Sri Lanka is entirely justified to do what it pleases within its own territorial boundaries. If India was spying on Sri Lanka, and perhaps the USA, then it can in no way object to the USA reciprocating the favour. It is also blatantly obvious that Sri Lanka had neither the capability nor the intention to spy on India.

3) Jayawardene giving the contract to repair the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farms to American Firms. Dixit claims that even though India offered the most reasonable prices, the contract was not given to them. Perhaps it escapes Dixit that when one accepts Indian prices, one also gets Indian quality and maybe the Sri Lankan Government had slightly higher standards in mind. Dixit further says, “This [contract] provided a potential base for American strategic presence around the important port of Trincomalee.” (Assignment Colombo, 1998) This is pure speculation – and Dixit uses even this as justification for later Indian military intimidation tactics against Sri Lanka.

4) Alleged private conversations between Jayawardene, President Sanjeewa Reddy and Prime Minister Morarji Desai which involved jokes about Mrs. Gandhi’s capacity to rule India. If this was indeed a factor in the way Mrs. Gandhi formulated her foreign policy towards India, not only must her leadership be brought into question, but her sanity as well. It is remarkable indeed that Mr. Dixit even brings up such a petty point in defense of India’s treatment of Sri Lanka.

5) The “churlish” behaviour of Prime Minister Premadasa who deliberately kept the Indian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Narasimha Rao waiting in his ante-room for 20 minutes. Dixit says, “This had its own ramifications on India’s attitudes.”

6) Visits by US General Vernon Walters to Colombo in October 1983 and 1984. “Walters was perceived by the Indian establishment as a confirmed Cold War warrior.” What Dixit is truly bitter about is the fact that Walters revealed to Jayewardene that India was training and arming Tamil terrorists. Dixit says that India had “confirmed information” (i.e. spy reports), that there was an agreement for Sri Lanka to assist the US in spying on India. Notice that it is nothing short of fantastic that Dixit is using even these visits for justifying Indian covert actions that began well before that.

7) “The parenthetical factor in Mrs. Gandhi’s estrangement from Mr. Jayewardena was her long-standing friendship with Mrs. Bandaranaike.” It is a pity that such petty considerations as this finally became deciding factors in the loss of so many lives, limbs and the innocence of youth.

Dixit claims that these were the factors, including pressure from Tamil Nadu, that led Mrs. Gandhi to interpret the situation at a “strategic challenge and threat” to Indian national security and to “generate pressure” on J.R. Jayawardene. If these assertions were in fact a true reflection of the internal situation, it would seem that the Indira Gandhi administration’s analysis of the International political situation was as poor as that of J.N. Dixit’s.

Clearly India had already started to support Tamil terrorists in Sri Lanka, by the time we attempted to get foreign military assistance. Therefore any attempt to justify India’s foreign policy towards Sri Lanka by claiming a geo-strategic threat is plain hypocrisy.

The most tragic aspect of India’s interference was the massive exacerbation of the terrorist situation. In July 1983 there were only some 300 terrorists in the five principal terrorist groups. By the time the Indo-Lanka accord was signed in July 1987 India had trained, armed or funded an estimated 30,000 terrorists (Swamy, Guneratne, Indian Intervention, Ethnic Crisis). Therefore, as far as Sri Lanka’s modern terrorist problem goes, it is reasonable to point out that it was created almost exclusively by India.

In 1987 Lalith Athulathmudali’s Vadamarachchi operation had the greatest potential to wipe out the terrorist threat. However, India’s strong arm tactics ended up in halting the military advance and in forcing an unpalateable political solution upon Sri Lanka (Hoole et al). To this day the Provincial Council system implemented through the 13th amendment continues to plague Sri Lankan society and the civil administration.

India has had a key role in compounding Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis and Tamil terrorist problem. She has given political support and sanctuary to Tamil terrorists. She has also armed, trained and funded Tamil terrorists. Further, she has consistently prevented the Sri Lankan state for effectively combating Tamil terrorism. Finally when Indian soldiers were operating on Sri Lankan soil, they engaged in massive atrocities against mostly Tamil civilians. It is fair to point out that India has more than just a moral culpability in the large scale deaths and destruction caused by Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. In such circumstances, India has a large moral responsibility in the manner in which she should act in the future. India is obliged to support the Sri Lankan state militarily and financially in wiping out terrorism. India is obliged (specifically under the Accord of 1987) to safeguard the unitary state of Sri Lanka. India is obliged to provide diplomatic support to the Sri Lankan Government in its fight against terrorism. And finally India is obliged to provide large scale financial assistance when the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the North and East takes place. It is hoped that India will take her obligations seriously.

A Youth Rebellion
One of the great overlooked factors in the ethnic conflict is that it was fundamentally a youth rebellion. The most prominent leaders of the movement were all youth. And to this date those who fight and die in the jungles of the North and East and in suicide attacks on the streets of Colombo are youth, some no more than fourteen years of age. One EPRLF member stated, “I was a student (in Jaffna) and my family members were staunch TULF supporters. When I first began taking an interest in militant politics, I was dissatisfied with the TULF’s slow pace of work. I started off with protest marches and hunger strikes. It was during my student days that I began taking interest in leftwing literature. This led to conflicts with my family, which was unhappy that I was moving around with people who believed in violence. My father was afraid that I might get caught and die. My mother was more understanding. She would listen to what I said while serving food. So our first battle was against the family” (Swamy).

The young man’s statement reveals several key insights. It shows that the traditional Tamil society was essentially non violent in ideology and supported recognised political parties (even if they were extremist in their ideas).

Secondly, the rebellion was against the traditional (Tamil) society. As the youth had stated, the 1st rebellion was against his own family. It was against the sedate and apparently unsatisfactory direction that politics were taking. In this there is a tremendous parrallel to the JVP uprising in the Sinhala areas of the country.

And finally it is more and more apparent that those who joined the militant groups did so for more than political reasons. It is widely accepted that one of the fundamental causes of the JVP uprisings of 1971 and 1983-1989 was the unemployment among educated youth. Somasundaram points out that while 29% of Sinhala students who passed A/L were unemployed, the figure for Tamils students was 41%. Therefore if unemployment among educated youth is a causal factor in engaging in armed rebellion against the state, the Tamil youth had a far greater predilection for it than the Sinhala youth. For the most part the militants comprised of the low caste, the unemployed and wretchedly poor, the criminals (Guneratne, Somasunderam, Swamy). They took to arms not because they had a great and noble dream, but because this was the only avenue open to them if they were not to perish from starvation. As such intensification of the rebellion can also be seen as a massive backlash to the income and expectation disparity created by the sudden opening up of the economy after 1977.

Caste Factor
At the early stages one out of only 4 demands made by Tamil terrorists and politicians was the abolition of the caste system. The caste system is something which prevailed among both the Sinhalese community and the Tamil. However, due to both cultural and geographic proximity to India, the Tamil community suffered far more acutely from the caste system than did the Sinhalese. Further, after independence, the Government of Sri Lanka was in no way responsible for either the presence or continuation of caste discrimination among Tamils. If at all the blame must lie with the State for allowing the Jaffna Tamils too much freedom to determine their own affairs. If the Government had stepped in and been more firm in the prevention of caste discrimination among Tamils, it is possible that people like Prabhakaran would never have been created.

Specifically, however, the caste problem among Tamils was something that they themselves propagated as part of their culture. Therefore with regard to this particular grievance the rebellion was solely against high caste Tamils. It was a singularly Tamil problem for which the Sri Lankan Government and the Sinhalese majority at large were made answerable for.

Towards A Solution:

I am not going to call this a political solution because it is not just a political solution. As mentioned previously, a key aspect of any analysis is to understand that there are two problems; an ethnic problem and a terrorist problem. Historically it has been obvious that mistaking the one for the other, or being blind to the existence of one, can be fatal.

The Terrorist Problem:

Terrorists can’t be negotiated with. And even if they can, they should not be negotiated with because we then assign them legitimacy and encourage terrorism in the future. Our leaders don’t seem to recognize this fundamental fact. None of the developed countries negotiate with terrorists. When they come across a terrorist situation they send in a special forces team. They don’t put up the leader of the terrorist group in a five star hotel and hold talks with him.

Historically there have been two occasions when the Sri Lankan state had the opportunity to wipe out terrorism. In the period between 1977 and 1983 and in May 1987. On both occasions it was the Indian Government and the state of Tamil Nadu that interfered and stopped us.

Further the Sri Lankan Government has continued to make several elementary mistakes in handling its military strategy.

1) Negotiating with LTTE terrorists is nothing less than suicidal. The only function of negotiations is to allow the Tigers breathing space to raise funds, buy weapons and train in preparation for a renewed wave of violence.

2) Perhaps the fundamental weakness of the military is that it is a conventional military fighting an unconventional enemy. The military must be trained in guerilla warfare. The military must use guerilla tactics against the tigers. When it conducts massive conventional operations, it is a matter of course for the Tigers to inflict crippling losses on the magnitude of Mulaitivu and Kilinochchi. Military analysts point out that to fight the highly trained LTTE a Sri Lankan soldier needs at least 9 months extensive training. The current 3 month crash training course is nothing more than a preparation of lambs for the slaughter. The 3 month training program is entirely the sign of a Government ignoring rational military imperatives in order to achieve hasty political objectives.

3) The war must be fought on three fronts: i. Intelligence, ii. Foreign Affairs, and iii. Military. Currently the military is blindly ignoring both the Intelligence and Foreign Affairs aspects of any systematic war effort. The NIB has been emasculated. The best men have been removed because they allegedly had UNP sympathies. A policeman was at one time appointed head of the organisation. International Intelligence organisations like CIA, MI6, Pakistan’s ISI and India’s RAW have given up cooperating with NIB in a mood of disgust. Without proper ground intelligence it is impossible to avoid disasters like the sudden overrunning of strategic camps like Kilinochchi. The LTTE raises some $2-3 million in funds internationally each month (Guneratne, Ethnic Crisis). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is doing virtually nothing to curb the flow of these funds. There is a steady supply of weapons to the Tigers which are carried in large ships. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is perhaps not even aware of this situation. There is no concerted international propaganda initiative to change Sri Lanka’s image and get foreign assistance in solving the problem.

4) The war must be taken to the LTTE instead of passively waiting in camps for them to attack. The most successful efforts against the LTTE were in small units that operated clandestinely and unexpectedly within LTTE controlled areas. For instance just 600 STF men effectively controlled the entire Baticoloa region (Guneratne, Ethnic Crisis). When they were removed and the army sent in, the State suffered huge defeats. Large conventional maneuvers are doomed to fail right from the outset. The terrorists can see and hear such formations coming for miles and can be fully prepared. Not even the US Army, with its huge technological advantage, could successfully fight the Viet Cong with conventional methods. It is truly sad that 30 years later Sri Lanka has not learned from lessons like that.

5) Even the navy needs to be revolutionised in order for it to be effective against this type of enemy. Sri Lanka has a “blue-water” navy. What she needs is a “brown-water” navy. In naval terms the critical areas are close to shore and in coves and beaches where the Tigers’ supply points are located (Guneratne, Ethnic Crisis). If the LTTE supply routes are cut-off they can be subdued within a matter of months. Right now what the navy is engaging in are conventional patrolling exercises that under-utilises its potential and makes sitting ducks of ships for hit and run attacks.

6) Promotions in the Sri Lankan military are based on seniority. There is no disciplinary action taken against military leaders who are involved in disasters like Kilinochchi. No effective military in the world has a seniority based promotion system. Essentially the military is led by old men with old ideas, not necessarily brilliant commanders who have proved themselves in battle. Sri Lanka needs to give recognition to daring young commanders. She need to use their expertise and modern tactical thinking. Without promoting combat tested military leaders to the top this war will never be won. The military does not possess any suicide cadres. To be effective against guerillas with a suicide mentality it is necessary to have an exceptionally fine tuned military machine.

7) Field commanders are not given the autonomy to be effective. Whenever the LTTE attacks they have to contact Colombo to request permission to retaliate. This is a ridiculous situation. For a Government that is ostentatiously so committed to the Devolution of power, this kind of reign holding in critical military situations is nothing less than hypocrisy. Further, the Sri Lankan forces are woefully equipped. In many instances soldiers on the front line are given ammunition on a rationed basis.

8) The entire LTTE is structured around Vellupillai Prabhakaran. The day this man is captured, the war will end. The military effort must be focused towards specific objectives like this.

Capturing territory is an entirely pointless exercise in this war. If we gain territory, the Tigers will simply fall back and regroup. Success in this war is determined on how many casualties can be inflicted at the minimum cost in lives and equipment to the armed forces. This government clearly has not recognised this fundamental principal.

Government officials and many analysts have claimed that this war cannot be won. When the Government fails to adhere to intelligent military management, the war certainly cannot be won. However it is inaccurate to make a categorical statement with regard to the war. The war most certainly can be won. However, this can only happen it the Government is committed to winning the war and if the corruption and inefficiency in the military establishment is rooted out.

Negotiations
Negotiations with the LTTE are futile. The Thimpu Talks of 1985 failed. The so-called Peace Accord of 1987 failed. The Premadasa Talks of 1990 Failed. The Kumaratunga talks of 1995 failed. The Norwegian intervention of 1999 Failed. And the reason for all these failures is fundamentally that the LTTE did not want a solution – not even Eelam which was virtually granted by the Indian army of occupation under Varadaraja Perumal.

From this point on in time, there can only be two types of national leaders who will attempt to negotiate with LTTE terrorists – traitors, and fools. Both these words may be considered rather harsh to be spoken in an academic forum. But this is not at academic issue. The lives of civilians and the lives of soldiers both depend on it.

There are two key considerations in going into negotiations:

1. Do the negotiations have even the remotest chance of succeeding?

2. Are you negotiating with the representatives of the people?

Negotiations should not be held with the LTTE because, 1. they are terrorists, and 2. it is clear that they are not the legitimate representatives of the Tamil people. Even the TULF can no longer be considered the true representatives of the Tamil people. Therefore, there is only one method to discover their true representatives; elections.

When the future candidates in Tamil areas run for elections, they should specifically state that if they were elected they would negotiate a settlement to the ethnic conflict with the Sri Lankan Government. Their agenda should be clearly stated in their election manifesto. Under these circumstances if these candidates are returned from Tamil majority areas, there can be no doubt that not only are they the legitimate representatives of the people, but they also have an unambiguous mandate to negotiate on their behalf.

However, no free and fair elections can be held in LTTE controlled areas. Given the LTTE’s historical reaction to elections, it is fair to say that they cannot be held at all in LTTE held areas. No free and fair elections can even be held so long as the LTTE are a significant player on the scene. Therefore in order to identify and appoint the true representatives of the people, the LTTE must first be eliminated. And this must be done militarily.

Conclusion
One conclusion of this paper is that Tamil politicians will have agitated for a separate state regardless of whether the Sinhala community in the country discriminated against Tamils or not. This is borne out by the evidence presented showing that Tamil separatist agitation clearly predates those instances generally regarded as having been discriminatory. Eelam is the dream that the Tamil people had in 1948. In negotiating any concessions for the Tamil people, the only criteria should be whether they deserve such concessions as equal citizens in this country. At no time should negotiations rest on a foundation of a punitive nature against the Sinhalese community

Analysing the historical aspect of the ethnic and Tamil terrorist problems in this country is only useful if we are able to use that history constructively. We can establish the true causal factors for ethnic tensions and attempt to avoid repeating those mistakes. We can use these as a basis for negotiating a solution that is equitable not only to the Tamil people but also to other ethnic groups. In military terms it is useful to understand how our military must change both in structure and in approach. And perhaps most important of all we can understand how to structure our national security strategy. Because wars don’t last forever, but they do recur. One day this war will end. One day we will fight another one. And when we do, it is probable that India will have something to do with it.

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