posted October 01, 2000 06:54 PM            

Tamilnation > Struggle for Tamil Eelam > Sri Lanka's Broken Pacts & Evasive
Proposals > Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact, 1957 >Dudley Senanayake -
Chelvanayakam Agreement, 1965 > District Councils, 1968 > District Development
Councils, 1979 > Annexure "C" Proposals, 1983> Thimpu Talks, 1985 > Indo Sri
Lanka Working Paper, 1985 > "December 19th Proposals", 1986 > Exchange of
Letters between India & Sri Lanka, 1987 > Indo Sri Lanka Agreement, 1987 >
Devolution or Comic Opera?, 1988 > Sri Lanka/LTTE Negotiations 1989/90 > Select
Committee - Interim Report,1992 > Sri Lanka's Peace Trap, 1994/95 > Sri Lanka's
Peace Mask: War Face: Chandrika's 'Devolution Package'
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Last updated
25/08/00
Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact, 1957
Dudley Senanayake - Chelvanayakam Agreement, 1965
District Councils White Paper, 1968
Satchi Ponnambalam on the Withdrawal of the 1968 District Councils White
Paper
Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978
District Development Councils, 1979
Parthasarathy's Annexure "C" Proposals, 1983
Thimpu Talks, July-August 1985
Indo Sri Lanka Working Paper, September 1985
The 1986 "December 19th Proposals"
Exchange of Letters between India & Sri Lanka - February 1987
Indo Sri Lanka Agreement & Exchange of Letters, July 1987
13th Amendment to Sri Lanka Constitution - Devolution or Comic Opera?
Sri Lanka/LTTE Peace Negotiations 1989/90
Mangala Moonesinghe Select Committee - Interim Report 1992
Sri Lanka's Peace Trap, 1994/95
Sri Lanka's Peace Mask: War Face - Chandrika's 'Devolution Package'
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SRI LANKA'S BROKEN PACTS
& EVASIVE PROPOSALS
"One of the essential elements that must be kept in mind in understanding the
Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is that, since 1958 at least, every time Tamil
politicians negotiated some sort of power-sharing deal with a Sinhalese
government - regardless of which party was in power - the opposition Sinhalese
party always claimed that the party in power had negotiated away too much. In
almost every case - sometimes within days - the party in power backed down on
the agreement." - (Professor Marshall Singer, at US Congress Committee on
International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Hearing on Sri
Lanka November 14,1995)
‘‘Whilst Sri Lanka talks peace it continues with its military efforts. If we
look at the past we can see why. Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism has been
institutionalised in Sri Lanka and today it has become more powerful than the
politicians themselves. Indeed even if some Sinhala politicians seek to settle
the conflict, Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism will seek to prevent such a
settlement. This is the political reality that those who are aware of the Sri
Lankan situation are well aware of. This Sinhala chauvinism which was nurtured
by Sinhala politicians for their electoral advantage, has grown into a
Frankenstein monster which now has the power to destroy and make politicians.
This we understand very well.’’ (Sathasivam Krishnakumar, Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, in an interview with Melbourne Community Radio CR3, September,
1991)
"...(The) perceived solution of self-determination has evolved and taken shape
by the compulsions of more than three decades of political struggles of the
Tamil people and their political leaders which ended in the ignominious
failure to arrive at any just solution by the process of negotiation between
the two parties. There lay in ruins the scrap-heap of broken pacts and
dishonoured agreements as to proposals for Regional Councils, District
Councils, Provincial Councils, Provincial/Regional Councils,
District/Provincial Councils - all tentative concepts and toothless bodies
with no genuine devolved powers of decentralization..." (Satchi Ponnamblam in
Tamils Right to Self Determination, July 1991)

Introduction...
1928 Donoughmore Commission proposal for Provincial Councils...
1957 Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact for direct election to Regional
Councils...
1965 Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Agreement for District Councils...
1970 Proposals by the Tamil Federal Party rejected by Sri Lanka...
1979 Presidential Commission to report on creation of District Development
Councils...
1983 Annexure C Proposals...
1985 Thimpu Talks...
1986 "19 December" Proposals...
1987 Indo Sri Lanka Peace Agreement..
1989/90 Premadasa Talks...
1992/93 Parliamentary Select Committee Reports...
1994 Peace Trap by Chandrika Government...
1995 Devolution Package...
The golden thread...

Introduction...
The record shows that during the past fifty years, the Tamil people in the
island of Sri Lanka have been subjected to an ever widening and deepening
oppression. Simultaneous with this process, the record also shows that the
dominant Sinhala majority has broken pacts and dishonoured agreements entered
into with the Tamil political leadership.
Furthermore, the 'proposals' placed by the Sri Lanka government, from time to
time, for the resolution of the conflict have consistently evaded the central
issue of the recognition of the Tamil people, as a people with a homeland. They
have, instead, adopted an assimilative approach, directed to absorb the Tamil
people into a Sinhala Buddhist Sri Lanka.

1928 Donoughmore Commission proposal for Provincial Councils...
Even before Sri Lanka became independent (1948) and as early as 1928, the
Donoughmore Commission recommended the establishment of Provincial Councils on
the ground that it was desirable that a large part of the administrative work of
the centre should come into the hands of persons resident in the districts and
thus more directly in contact with the needs of the area.
Twelve years later the Executive Committee of Local Administration chaired by
the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, considered the proposal of the Donoughmore
Commission and in 1940, the State Council (the legislature) approved the
establishment of Provincial Councils.In 1947, on the floor of the House of
Representatives, the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike again declared his support for
the establishment of Provincial Councils.
In 1955, the Choksy Commission recommended the establishment of Regional
Councils to take over the functions that were exercised by the Kacheries and in
May 1957, the government of the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike presented a draft of
the proposed Bill for the establishment of Regional Councils.

1957 Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact for direct election to Regional
Councils...
Subsequently, in July 1957, the Bandaranaike- Chelvanayakam Pact made provision
for direct election to Regional Councils and also provided that the subjects
covered by Regional Councils shall include agriculture, cooperatives, lands and
land development, colonisation and education. The Pact however did not survive
the opposition of sections of the Sinhala community led by Buddhist priests and
which included the opposition Sinhala United National Party led by
J.R.Jayawardene (who twenty years later, in 1977 became Sri Lanka's first
executive President).
At the General Elections in March 1960 (after the death of
Mr.S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike) neither of the two Sinhala dominated parties, the
S.L.F.P. nor the U.N.P. won an overall majority in Parliament. The Federal Party
submitted to both the S.L.F.P. and the U.N.P. a statement of minimum demands.
The U.N.P. did not refer to these demands in the Throne Speech, the Federal
Party voted against the Throne Speech, the government was defeated and fresh
elections were called.
At the subsequent elections in July 1960, the Federal Party supported the
S.L.F.P. (led this time by Mrs.Srimavo Bandaranaike) on the basis of the
S.L.F.P. pledge to implement measures on the lines of the 1957
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. But the S.L.F.P. won the General Elections with
an overall majority and did not implement the agreement.
In July 1963, the government of Mrs. Bandaranaike declared that 'early
consideration' would be given to the question of the establishment of District
Councils to replace the Kacheries and the government appointed a Committee on
District Councils and the report of this Committee containing a draft of the
proposed Bill to establish District Councils was published but again nothing was
in fact done.

1965 Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Agreement for District Councils...
After the 1965 General Elections, a pact was negotiated to secure the support of
the Federal Party for the formation of a U.N.P.government led by Dudley
Senanayake. Following upon the 1965 Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Agreement,
the UNP government declared that it would give 'earnest consideration' to the
establishment of District Councils and in 1968 a draft Bill approved by the
Dudley Senanayake Cabinet was presented as a White Paper and this Bill provided
for the establishment of District Councils.
This time round, the opposition to the Bill was spearheaded by the Sri Lanka
Freedom Party which professed to follow the policies of the late S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike who himself had in 1940, 1947 and again in 1957, supported the
establishment of Provincial/Regional Councils. In view of the opposition, the
Dudley Senanayake government withdrew the District Councils Bill in July 1968
and the Federal Party then withdrew from the government.

1970 Proposals by the Tamil Federal Party rejected by Sri Lanka...
After yet another General Election in 1970, which was won by a large majority by
the S.L.F.P. led by Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike, a Constituent Assembly was
established to enact an authochnous constitution. The Federal Party submitted
proposals to the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs for:
1. A federal form of government with an autonomous Tamil state, an autonomous
Muslim state and three autonomous Sinhala states;
2. Tamil Language Regulation 1966 to be incorporated into the constitution;
3. Mother tongue to be the compulsory medium of instruction for all Tamil
children
The Federal Party withdrew from the Constituent Assembly in June 1971, after its
proposed amendment on parity of status for the Tamil and Sinhala languages was
defeated. The Constituent Assembly passed the new Constitution (which gave
Ceylon the Sinhala name 'Sri Lanka' and gave a dominant Constitutional role for
Buddhism) on 22 May 1972. The Federal Party parliamentarians boycotted the
meeting.

1979 Presidential Commission to inquire and report on the creation of District
Development Councils...
In August 1979, Sri Lanka President J.R.Jayawardene appointed a Presidential
Commission to inquire and report on the creation of District Development
Councils. The Commission included, Mr.Neelan Thiruchelvam and Professor Alfred
Jeyaratnam Wilson who both had the support of the Tamil United Liberation Front.

But though the Presidential Commission had been touted as a body which would
address the issues arising from the ethnic conflict, in the event, the
Commission concluded that the scheme that they had envisaged "would be
applicable to all of the 24 districts in the Island irrespective of their ethnic
composition" and was "not intended to provide a different political or
administrative structure for any particular part of the country."

1983 Annexure C Proposals...
Subsequent to Genocide'83 and the death of thousands of Tamils at the hands of
Sinhala mobs in July/August 1983, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent her
representative, Mr.G.Parthasarathy for discussions with Sri Lanka and with the
Tamil United Liberation Front.
As a result of Mr. Parthasarthy's discussions, a set of proposals were
formulated. The Sri Lanka Government agreed to convene an All Party Conference
to consider these proposals. The proposals were submitted as an annexure to a
statement submitted by President Jayawardene to the All Party Conference and
came to be known as Annexure "C" proposals..
But though President Jayewardene had agreed in discussions with Mr.Parthasarathy
that these proposals would form the basis of negotiations, the Government of Sri
Lanka failed to adopt these Proposals at the All Party Conference discussions
which commenced in December 1983.
The All Party Conference dragged on till December 1984, when the Jayewardene
Government presented proposals in the form of a draft 10th Amendment to the
Constitution and a draft District and Provincial Councils Development Bill. The
Sri Lanka proposals merely extended the scheme of decentralization at District
level to the Provincial level with limited co-ordination. The TULF rejected
these proposals and the All Party Conference collapsed.

1985 Thimpu Talks...
In July and August 1985 the leaders of the Tamil armed resistance, together with
the Tamil United Liberation Front participated in talks with the Sri Lanka
government. The talks, sponsored by India, were held in Thimpu, the capital of
Bhutan with a view to resolving the conflict.
At the Thimpu Talks, the Sri Lankan Government presented proposals, which were
in substance, a repetition of the proposals by the Government to the aborted All
Party Conference in Colombo in December 1984.
These proposals had been rejected by the TULF and the action of the Sri Lankan
government in placing similar proposals once again at the Thimpu talks called in
question the good faith of the Government and its commitment to seek a just
solution at these talks.
The intent of the proposals that were presented by Sri Lanka at Thimpu was
clear. The unit of devolution was not even the province but the district.
Further, the District Councils were without executive power. Their limited
legislative power to enact subsidiary legislation was made subject to the
control and approval of the President. Finally the funds to be placed at the
disposal of a District Council were to be determined at the discretion of a
commission appointed by the President.
The proposals evidenced the intention of the Sri Lankan government to manage and
control the Tamil people even in the relatively insignificant functional areas
where the District Councils were given some jurisdiction. In the end, the Thimpu
Talks collapsed because even as the talks continued, Sri Lanka renewed its
military offensive in the Tamil homeland.

1986 "19 December" Proposals...
After the collapse of the Thimpu Talks, India attempted 'indirect negotiations'
- with Indian officials talking to the Sri Lanka government and the TULF
separately. The LTTE and the other militant groups (with the possible exception
of PLOTE) were not involved in these 'indirect negotiations'. At the end of
these 'indirect negotiations' on 30.8.1985 the Sri Lankan side presented a
Working Paper (Draft Framework of Accord and Understanding) which, it was agreed
by the Government of India, could serve as the basis for further negotiations.
The Working Paper envisaged the creation of separate Provincial Councils for the
Northern and Eastern Provinces by amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. Yet
again, the Proposals refused to recognise the existence of the Tamil homeland in
the North-East. During October and November 1985, India's Foreign Secretary,
Romesh Bhandari, attempted to secure the agreement of the Tamil militant groups
to the Sri Lanka Working Paper but not surprisingly failed.
In mid December 1986, Indian Minister of State Mr. Natwar Singh and Mr. P.
Chidambaram visited Colombo and fresh proposals were evolved (which came to be
known as the "December 19 Proposals").
These proposals involved the formation of a new Eastern Province by excising
Sinhalese majority areas (Amparai Electoral District) from the existing Eastern
Province, and the creation of two Tamil Provincial Councils in the Northern and
the reconstituted Eastern Province. The Sri Lanka government agreed to consider
a proposal for a Second Stage of constitutional development which would provide
for the Northern Province and the new Eastern Province being merged.
However, soon after the return of the Indian Ministers, the Sri Lankan
Government expressed reservations and resiled from the December 19 position and
this is reflected in the exchange of letters between India and Sri Lanka in
February 1987. (see also A booklet, published by the Indian intelligence sources
in 1987)

1987 Indo Sri Lanka Peace Agreement...
The events after the collapse of the Thimpu Talks reinforced the belief that
given Sri Lanka's intransigence, India had decided to adopt the soft option and
secure its own strategic interests, even if that be at the expense of the
aspirations of the Tamil people.
The Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement was signed on the 29th of July 1987 by Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayawardene. It was an agreement that
went back even on the Chidambaram 'December 19' proposals. The Agreement did not
recognise the existence of an identified Tamil homeland and resorted to the
subterfuge of a referendum to evade facing the issue posed by the demand for a
merger of the North and East.
The Exchange of Letters that preceded the signing of the Agreement declared that
"Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for
military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests" and
that the " work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank will be
undertaken as a joint operation between India and Sri Lanka."
In August 1987, the Sri Lankan Parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the
Constitution and the ancillary Provincial Councils Act and claimed that the
enactment of these laws fulfilled the promises made in the 1987 Indo Sri Lanka
Accord, to 'devolve power' on the Tamil people.
However, the 13th Amendment and the ancillary Provincial Councils Act was a
constitutional comic opera which created Provincial 'Ministers' without
executive power and at the same time a Provincial Governor, appointed by the
Sinhala President, who would exercise executive power in respect of provincial
matters - a Provincial Governor who was also the administrative head of the
provincial public service and who has control of the Provincial Finance Fund.
The architects of the 13th Amendment refused to break away from the path
trodden by successive Sinhala governments which have sought to divide the
Tamil people into smaller units and so eventually assimilate and 'integrate'
them into a homogeneous Sinhala nation - an assimilating path which had led to
confrontation and which had culminated in the armed struggle of the Tamil
people against that which they rightly regarded as genocide.
India and Sri Lanka sought to enforce the Indo Sri Lanka Agreement by resort to
force and the Indian Army was invited to the North-East by Sri Lanka President
Jayawardene.

1989/90 Premadasa Talks...
In December 1989, Sri Lanka elected a new President, Ranasinghe Premadasa who
assumed office on 2 January 1989. President Premadasa was intent on securing the
withdrawal of the IPKF because of opposition by Sinhala militants (JVP) to
Indian presence in the island. The new President engaged the LTTE in talks which
commenced in April/May 1989 and the IPKF was compelled to leave in early 1990.
But with the departure of the IPKF, President Premadasa dragged his feet on the
basic LTTE demands re the dissolution of the North-East provincial councils
(which had been elected under an electoral process rigged by the so called
Indian Peace Keeping Force), the holding of fresh elections and the repeal of
the 6th Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution. In June 1990, the talks
inevitably collapsed and the armed conflict resumed. (see also Tamil Times and
the War on the People)

1992/93 Parliamentary Select Committee Reports...
Thereafter, yet another Sri Lanka President, D.B.Wijetunga, set in motion a
Parliamentary Select Committee to address the question of devolution. The Select
Committee sat for two years, issued an Interim Report in 1992 and its Final
Report in 1993.
The Select Committee proposals sought to impose a nine province pseudo 'federal'
structure on the island - 'pseudo' because according to the Chairman of the
Select Committee, the report envisaged 'devolution of power' without using the
term 'federal in any manifest sense'!
The seven Sinhala provinces in the South were treated in the same way as the two
Tamil provinces in the NorthEast and that in itself was proof enough of the
meagre nature of the powers that may be exercised by each province.

1994 Peace Trap by Chandrika Government...
In August 1994, the newly elected Sri Lanka government led by Chandrika
Kumaratunga engaged the Liberation Tigers in talks yet again. But in an
interview with the Sinhala owned Sri Lanka Sunday Times, an year later, on 20
August 1995, Sri Lanka President Kumaratunga admitted:
" We conducted talks on the basis that the LTTE would not agree to any
peaceful settlement and lay down arms."
The attempted entrapment of the Liberation Tigers failed and the 'Peace Trap'
collapsed on 19 April 1995.

1995 Devolution Package...
On 3 August 1995, Sri Lanka President Kumaratunga released a 'Devolution'
package with the stated objective of ending the ethnic conflict in the island.
At the same time she reaffirmed her intention to wage war against the Liberation
Tigers and launched a genocidal attack on the Tamil homeland in the north of the
island of Sri Lanka. The 'Devolution Package' appeared to be no more than a
peace mask to Sri Lanka's war face.
The 'new' proposals once again, refused to recognise the existence of the Tamil
homeland, rejected an asymmetric approach, continued to treat all the provinces
in the same way and to insist on a unitary state. In March 1997, the Sri Lanka
government released some chapters of the new Constitution but held back on the
provisions relating to devolution. In October 1997, this was followed up with a
completed Draft Constitution. At the sametime, Sri Lanka intensified its
genocidal war against the Tamil people.

The golden thread...
A 'golden thread' runs through every single set of proposals from the 1928
Donoughmore Commission recommendations, through the 1957 Bandaranaike
Chelvanayakam Agreement, the 13th Amendment and the Kumaratunga package
(including the Sri Lanka Constitution Bill of August 2000) - and that is the
Sinhala people's rejection of an asymmetric approach and the insistence that
whatever 'devolution' or 'decentralisation' that was on offer was equally
available to the Sinhala provinces (which had never struggled or demanded
'devolution' or 'decentralisation') and to the Tamil areas in the North and East
of the island.
More recently, faced with the determined demand for recognition of the right to
self determination of the people of Tamil Eelam, atempts have been made to
develop a constitutional theory of 'internal' and 'external' self determination.
The record of broken pacts, dishonoured agreements and evasive proposals reveals
Sinhala chauvinism's consistent refusal to recognise the existence of the Tamil
people as a "people" with an historic homeland and the right to freely determine
their political status - the right to freely determine the terms on which the
Sinhala people and the Tamil people may associate with each other in equality
and in freedom.
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